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Key points: 
 The election saw a clear victory for the centrist Civic Platform (PO), which thus became 
the first incumbent governing party to secure re-election for a second term of office since 
1989, while the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party came a strong but fairly distant 
second.  
 Although many Civic Platform supporters were disappointed with the party’s slow 
progress in modernising the country, most voters saw it as the better guarantor of stability 
at a time of crisis and continued to harbour deeply ingrained concerns about the possible 
implications of Law and Justice returning to power. 
 The Polish Peasant Party (PSL), Civic Platform’s junior coalition partner, held on to its 
share of the vote, giving the governing coalition a small but workable majority. 
 The Palikot Movement (RP), a new anti-clerical liberal party, emerged as the third largest 
grouping in the new Sejm, overtaking the once-powerful communist successor 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) which suffered its worst ever election defeat. 
 Although the election coincided with Poland’s first ever turn at the head of the rotating 
EU presidency, the two main parties focused mainly on domestic issues and treated 
Europe as a ‘valence issue’ where they competed over who was most competent to 
represent and advance Polish national interests within the EU; as well as an opportunity to 
highlight their different political styles and self-images. 
 The re-elected government was likely to continue to function smoothly, although the 
imperative to introduce more radical reforms might force Civic Platform to threaten the 
interests of its partner’s core rural-agricultural electorate and the election result gave it 
other coalition options. 
 
 
Background/Context 
 
During the 2007-11 parliament the Polish political scene was very stable with support for the 
four main parties remaining fairly constant. The two parties that won the largest share of the 
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previous 2007 parliamentary election
1
 remained dominant: the centrist Civic Platform (PO), 
the main governing party led by prime minister Donald Tusk, and the right-wing conservative 
Law and Justice party (PiS), the main opposition grouping led by Jarosław Kaczyński, Mr 
Tusk's predecessor as prime minister. However, Civic Platform retained a substantial lead 
and continued to enjoy the steady support of around 40-50% of the electorate. This was an 
extra-ordinarily high level of support for a governing party and nearly twice that recorded by 
Law and Justice, its closest rival which remained stuck at around 20-30%. Civic Platform 
even managed to emerge unscathed from a major lobbying and corruption scandal following 
allegations by the central anti-corruption bureau (CBA) in September 2009 that senior 
ministers and party leaders had acted covertly on behalf of the gambling industry to block 
legislation that would have increased betting taxes. Although the ‘gambling affair’ forced Mr 
Tusk to dismiss and side-line some of his closest aides, it had no apparent impact on the 
party’s support. 
 
This was a remarkable and unprecedented record in Polish politics which was more 
accustomed to the rise and disappearance of governing parties. Although the nature of 
popular support for the government was often very shallow, Mr Tusk’s administration 
generally had more declared supporters than opponents, and throughout the period the prime 
minister remained one of Poland’s most popular politicians. Polish voters clearly warmed to 
his apparently consensual style compared to that of Mr Kaczyński, his more combative 
predecessor. Civic Platform and Law and Justice thus had an apparent ‘lock’ on the Polish 
electorate and within that duopoly Mr Tusk's party appeared to have an in-built majority.  
 
Opinion polls also showed the communist successor Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), the 
smaller left-wing opposition grouping, third with around 10-15% support. The Alliance had 
previously been one of the strongest parties in Poland and governed from 1993-97 and 2001-
5 but was in the doldrums since its support collapsed in the 2005 parliamentary election 
following its involvement in a series of spectacular high level corruption scandals.
2
 National 
polls often showed the agrarian Polish Peasant Party (PSL), Civic Platform’s junior coalition 
partner in government, struggling to secure the 5% vote share required to obtain 
parliamentary representation. However, the party more than held its own in the October-
November 2010 regional assembly elections when it came third with over 16% of the vote 
nationally. 
 
The Civic Platform-Peasant Party coalition was much more cohesive than most of its 
predecessors; indeed, this was probably one of the most stable governments in post-1989 
Poland. The key to its stability was the political partnership between Mr Tusk and Peasant 
Party leader Waldemar Pawlak, who held the office of deputy prime minister and economy 
minister. The two leaders were generally able to defuse tensions and problematic issues 
before they became too contentious or escalated into major public disputes. This was helped 
by the fact that the Peasant Party was primarily an office-seeking party with a clearly defined 
rural-agricultural electoral constituency, making it a pragmatic negotiating partner with a 
fairly narrow policy agenda. Importantly, the fact that the two parties had somewhat different 
core electorates and bases of support, with the Civic Platform primarily an urban party and 
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the Peasant Party’s voters drawn mainly from rural communities, meant that they were not in 
direct competition for the same voters. The Peasant Party also appeared to have drawn 
lessons from earlier periods as a member of coalition governments during the 1990s and early 
2000s when it was a very difficult partner and distanced itself very publicly from the main 
ruling party whenever its poll ratings declined or the government encountered difficulties. 
This was particularly true when the party was defending the interests of its core rural-
agricultural constituency. However, this time around Mr Pawlak’s party pursued a very 
different strategy: making a virtue of its predictability and self-consciously trying to project 
an image as a constructive and moderating force in Polish politics. At the same time, it 
concentrated on ‘delivering’ for its core rural-agricultural electorate both in terms of policy - 
by, for example, protecting the heavily state-subsidised social security system for farmers 
(KRUS) - and through its control of government-appointed posts and agencies, especially in 
the agricultural sector. As long as Civic Platform was careful not to push ahead too quickly 
with policy reforms that threatened to undermine the interests of the Peasant Party’s core 
farming constituency, or on other issues where it felt that it might not have been able to count 
on its partner’s support, then the coalition functioned smoothly. 
 
Nonetheless, Civic Platform’s support was shallow and not based on any particular 
enthusiasm for the government or its policies. For sure, Mr Tusk’s administration was 
generally felt to have done a competent job and it took credit for ensuring that Poland was the 
only EU member that came through the first wave of the global financial crisis in 2008-9 
without falling into recession. However, although Civic Platform had made a bold campaign 
pledge in the 2007 election that it would deliver an ‘economic miracle’, fearing the political 
consequences Mr Tusk’s government failed to capitalise on its electoral mandate and move 
ahead quickly with the more radical social and economic policy reforms that were advocated 
by many analysts as necessary for the party to live up to its election promises. As a 
consequence, the government was heavily criticised, even by its own supporters, for its lack 
of major achievements and ambition. This led to a steady erosion in the government’s public 
approval ratings and satisfaction with its performance, particularly evaluations of its handling 
of the economy.  
 
In its defence, the government’s supporters argued that, initially at least, it was hugely 
constrained by the fact that it had to ‘co-habit’ with President Lech Kaczyński, the Law and 
Justice party leader’s twin brother. Given his very close links with Law and Justice, Mr 
Kaczyński quickly emerged as a natural focus for opposition and found himself in a perpetual 
and debilitating conflict with the government. Although he had few executive prerogatives, 
Mr Kaczyński could veto legislation and on a number of occasions refused to sign key 
elements of the government’s programme. The government lacked the three-fifths 
parliamentary majority in the Sejm, the more powerful lower house of parliament, required to 
over-turn the presidential veto, and therefore needed the support of the Democratic Left 
Alliance in key votes to secure it. This became more difficult when, at the party’s June 2008 
congress, Grzegorz Napieralski defeated the incumbent Wojciech Olejniczak in a close and 
divisive contest for the party leadership. While Mr Olejniczak, along with most of the party’s 
best known leaders, had favoured co-operating with the government against Law and Justice, 
Mr Napieralski adopted a new political strategy based on making fewer concessions to, and 
distancing his party from, the Tusk administration.  
 
However, in April 2010 President Kaczyński and 95 others, including many senior Polish 
officials and public figures, died in a plane crash at Smolensk in western Russia on their way 
to a memorial service honouring the thousands of Polish officers killed by the Soviet NKVD 
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secret police in the Katyn forest in 1940. Mr Kaczyński’s untimely death and the subsequent 
election of Bronisław Komorowski, a Civic Platform nominee, as President in July 20103 
removed an important constitutional obstacle to the implementation of the government’s 
programme and left Mr Tusk’s party controlling all the main organs of state power. 
Nonetheless, with a parliamentary election scheduled for autumn 2011, the government still 
remained instinctively cautious of introducing radical reforms that might alienate voters. The 
Peasant Party’s presence as a junior coalition partner also acted as a block on the introduction 
of certain reforms, particularly any attempts to radically overhaul the KRUS social security 
system for farmers. However, Civic Platform’s reluctance to accelerate reforms was also part 
of its broader governing philosophy which tried to turn programmatic timidity and 
ideological eclecticism into a virtue. Civic Platform’s strategy of ‘reform by small steps’ was 
integral to the its long-term strategy of transforming itself from an economically liberal and 
socially conservative centre-right party into a non-ideological and all-inclusive centrist 
grouping that was attractive to a very wide spectrum of voters (what some critics dubbed a 
‘post-political party of power’). 
 
In fact, rather than any particular enthusiasm for Mr Tusk’s government or its programme, 
Civic Platform’s greatest electoral asset was the public’s continued aversion to the turbulent 
and often emotionally charged style of politics that most Poles associated with the 2005-7 
Law and Justice-led governments and Jarosław Kaczyński in particular. Even the 
government’s supporters often defended the Tusk administration on the grounds that its main 
achievement was to restore social harmony and, for all his alleged indecisiveness, Polish 
voters seemed to prefer Mr Tusk’s apparently more consensual style of politics. Law and 
Justice found it increasingly (and frustratingly) difficult to break this logic. The party did 
make various attempts to present a more conciliatory image and focus on ‘bread and butter’ 
economic issues and modernising Poland, pushing its traditional themes (such as fighting 
crime and corruption, and making a more fundamental break with the communist past) into 
the background. But most of the time these efforts had little impact on the party’s fortunes. 
The only period when Law and Justice appeared to be narrowing Civic Platform’s opinion 
poll lead was in the run up to the June-July 2010 presidential election that followed the 
Smolensk tragedy. Running an extremely effective and sure-footed campaign directed by 
politicians from the party’s moderate wing, Mr Kaczyński used the snap election as an 
opportunity to re-invent his party by softening its rhetoric and reaching out to centrist voters. 
In the event, by winning 36.5% in the first round (compared to 41.5% for Mr Komorowski) 
Mr Kaczyński managed to force a second round run-off, which he lost but with a respectable 
47% of the votes. 
 
However, almost as soon as the election results were announced Mr Kaczyński quickly 
abandoned the more moderate and consensual tone that he adopted during the presidential 
campaign and returned to his earlier confrontational style. Disassociating himself from the 
moderates who had run his presidential campaign, the Law and Justice leader launched a 
series of bitter attacks on the ruling party and refused to co-operate with the newly elected 
President, describing his election as a ‘misunderstanding’ and symbolically boycotting his 
inauguration. Mr Kaczyński also started to make the Smolensk air crash and subsequent 
investigation into its causes a central issue for the party, saying that the government bore 
‘moral and political responsibility’ for the errors that led to the tragedy through its relentless 
attacks on his brother and lack of care for his security. He also accused the prime minister of 
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weakness and naively playing into the Russian’s hands by allowing Moscow to oversee the 
main crash investigation.  
 
Mr Kaczyński’s inflammatory rhetoric and focus on Smolensk squandered the political 
capital that the party had accumulated during the presidential election. His uncompromising 
stance may have buttressed support for Law and Justice among its core supporters. However, 
as the party’s disappointing showing in the autumn 2010 local elections (when it failed to win 
control of any of Poland’s 16 regional authorities) showed, over-doing the aggressive 
language and using the Smolensk tragedy as a political weapon prevented Law and Justice 
from offering a coherent alternative to Civic Platform and eroded support for the party among 
more moderate voters. Indeed, Mr Kaczyński’s post-election volte face forced a group of 
leading Law and Justice moderates led by Joanna Kluzik-Rostkowska (who had been his 
presidential campaign manager) to break away from the party and, in November 2010, form a 
new centre-right grouping called ‘Poland is the Most Important’ (PJN - which was Mr 
Kaczynski’s presidential campaign slogan).  
 
 
The Campaign 
 
At the start of the campaign, the only questions thus appeared to be about the extent of Civic 
Platform’s victory, whether or not its junior coalition partner would be able to cross the 5% 
threshold, and if Mr Tusk’s party would need to find new or additional coalition partners to 
govern? Civic Platform began the election by holding a successful national convention at 
which party members, led by Mr Tusk, debated the party’s activities since its formation in 
2001 and drew up a balance sheet of the its four years in government. The ruling party’s 
campaign was based on setting out a general vision for the evolutionary reform and 
modernisation of Poland aimed at making the country a strong player within Europe. Mr 
Tusk’s party tried to take credit for Poland’s relatively strong economic performance, arguing 
that it was in large part due to various government measures that Poland remained a ‘green 
island of growth’ within Europe. At a time of increasing economic uncertainty, they argued, 
Poles should choose a safe and competent team that had at least started the process of 
modernisation and investment in the country’s future prosperity and development; 
exemplified by the party’s cautious initial campaign slogan ‘Poland Under Construction’. 
 
Civic Platform also used its tenth-anniversary convention to highlight that it was winning 
over new converts from rival parties, as well-known figures from across the political 
spectrum switched allegiance and declared their intention to run on Civic Platform’s 
candidate lists. Thus, one of the convention highlights was a speech by Mrs Kluzik-
Rostkowska, perhaps the most controversial of the ‘switchers’, where she declared that she 
would be leaving Poland is the Most Important to support Civic Platform. At the other end of 
the political spectrum, the convention also the saw the accession to the party of well-known 
centre-left politicians, following the earlier defection to Civic Platform of Bartosz 
Arłukowicz, one of the most high profile and popular left-wing figures linked to the 
Democratic Left Alliance. Mr Arłukowicz - who, ironically, first gained national prominence 
due to his high profile role in a special parliamentary commission set up to investigate the so-
called ‘gambling affair’ - joined the government as the prime minister’s plenipotentiary for 
contact with the ‘socially excluded’; a ministerial position created especially for him. These 
defections were part of a concerted long-term strategy designed to broaden Civic Platform’s 
appeal and trying to neutralise and weaken its political opponents by co-opting some of their 
best known politicians and authority figures. In his keynote party convention address, Mr 
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Tusk stressed that he saw the presence of such a wide range of views and opposing opinions 
within Civic Platform as one of its strengths.  
 
Much of the summer campaigning was dominated by the so-called ‘debate about debates’ 
which started when Mr Tusk challenged Mr Kaczyński and senior Law and Justice politicians 
to take part in a series of televised confrontations with Civic Platform’s incumbent ministers. 
Mr Tusk wanted to highlight Law and Justice’s lack of experienced, high quality specialists 
who could handle the top jobs of running the country, given that Mr Kaczyński’s party lost 
many of its most talented and experienced members in the Smolensk crash. The Civic 
Platform leader also tried to capitalise on the fact that he was a much more accomplished TV 
debater than Mr Kaczyński. Mr Tusk out-performed the Law and Justice leader in their last 
debate before the 2007 election, which was widely considered to be a turning point in that 
campaign, and this made Mr Kaczyński extremely wary of participating in such forums 
alongside the Civic Platform leader. Mr Kaczyński therefore insisted on a series of terms and 
conditions that he knew the Civic Platform leader would never accept (stipulating that the 
debates be held in the Law and Justice party headquarters) or were un-measurable 
(announcing that he would only debate when the prime minister agreed to ‘lower the white 
flag’, implying that he had been insufficiently robust in both confronting vested interests at 
home and defending Poland’s interests abroad). 
 
Initially, it seemed that Law and Justice’s refusal to debate with Civic Platform would lose 
the party support by making it appear weak and unprofessional. However, this was not the 
case and, as the campaign progressed, it became an increasingly tight race. Mr Kaczyński’s 
strategy of embarking on a nationwide speaking tour instead of participating in televised 
debates appeared to work, while Civic Platform, having originally expected to cruise to 
victory, found itself increasingly on the defensive and struggling to develop a clear campaign 
message. Moreover, although Mr Kaczyński’s campaign speeches could be quite sharp in 
tone, once again Law and Justice tried to moderate its more abrasive rhetoric. Knowing it had 
little scope to win over many voters beyond its core, the party concentrated instead on 
running a ‘softer and gentler’ campaign aimed at de-mobilising those Civic Platform voters 
who were motivated primarily by fear of Mr Kaczyński. Mr Kaczyński also avoided focusing 
too much on the Smolensk air crash which party strategists knew was not a major concern to 
voters beyond its core electorate and gave the impression that the party was backward 
looking and obsessed with a single issue. At the same time, they knew that the party could 
rely upon the ‘below the radar’ support of the many civil society initiatives that arose among 
those who were still fired up by the relentless search for the culprits behind the Smolensk 
tragedy. Although it was not part of the official campaign, the Smolensk issue thus 
consolidated and mobilised the party’s most committed supporters, which it knew could be 
very significant in the event of a low turnout. 
 
In its official campaign, however, Law and Justice attempted to construct a broader appeal by 
concentrating on issues such as: unemployment, health care, opportunities for young people, 
and the poor state of Poland’s infrastructure. Mr Kaczyński’s party seized on the fact that 
many Poles felt that, even taking the economic crisis into account, Mr Tusk’s government 
had not delivered the increase in opportunities that it had promised in 2007, a message 
exemplified by its main campaign slogan ‘Poland Deserves More’. Indeed, one of the 
leitmotifs of the Law and Justice campaign became a question posed by pepper farmer 
Stanisław Kowalczyk who spoiled what was meant to be a routine campaign visit for Mr 
Tusk. In front of live TV cameras, Mr Kowalczyk complained about how he and other 
farmers had not received any help from the government after heavy gales had devastated 
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farms in his region and asked in an emotional voice: ‘How do I live now Mr prime minister, 
how do I live?’ The line was quickly picked up by Mr Kaczyński’s party and Mr Kowalczyk 
was invited to speak at a Law and Justice election convention. Interestingly, Law and Justice 
also made a particularly strong pitch to younger voters, who were crucial in getting Civic 
Platform elected in 2007. Law and Justice correctly identified a ‘glass ceiling’ that many 
young Poles, especially those from smaller towns and rural areas, felt that they encountered 
and the fact that, in spite of economic growth, Poland still had high levels of youth 
unemployment and even many of those who managed to get a job struggled to obtain (much 
less pay) mortgages and support their families. This included a high profile campaign poster 
featuring a number of its younger female candidates with the strap-line: ‘Come with us!’ 
which contrasted strongly with the (generally middle aged and greying) men who featured in 
many of the Civic Platform campaign adverts. 
 
For its part, Civic Platform knew that it could not concentrate solely on its relatively modest 
achievements in office. Although it came up with a rather defensive slogan for the final stage 
of the campaign (‘We will do more’), the party also developed a strong counter-offensive. 
Firstly, it drew upon Mr Tusk, perhaps the party’s single greatest electoral asset and certainly 
its most effective campaigner, who undertook a nationwide tour on the so-called ‘Tuskobus’. 
The road show of semi-planned encounters, speeches, interviews and press conferences 
ensured continual media coverage as the Civic Platform leader visited poorer towns and was 
seen to listen to ordinary voters’ concerns and complaints. Mr Tusk also showed that we was 
not afraid to face down angry anti-government football supporters who regularly attacked 
him for what they claimed was his administration’s excessively authoritarian crackdown on 
hooliganism. 
 
Secondly, in the final stages of the campaign Civic Platform significantly ratcheted up its 
anti-Law and Justice rhetoric. For example, it released an extremely powerful campaign 
advert showing scuffles between a group who protested against the removal of a cross that 
was erected in front of the Presidential Palace after the Smolensk tragedy and the authorities, 
together with violent scenes involving football hooligans. The so-called ‘defenders of the 
cross’ were associated with the Mr Kaczyński’s party and some Law and Justice leaders had 
also expressed sympathy for known football hooligans defending them as ‘patriots’. The 
advert ended with the phrase, ‘They are going to vote, what about you?’ implying that a Law 
and Justice victory would hand Poland over to the kind of people depicted in the film. Civic 
Platform’s efforts to mobilise its more passive supporters were also helped by a controversial 
book-length interview with Mr Kaczyński published towards the end of the election. Here the 
Law and Justice leader said that German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s ascent to power did not 
happen ‘by chance alone’ and suggested that she was trying to re-build German imperial 
power. Law and Justice was thus forced to spend much of the last week of the campaign 
trying to explain what exactly Mr Kaczyński meant to say and responding to claims that the 
party was playing on anti-German sentiments.  
 
 
Results 
 
As Table 1 shows, the election saw a clear victory for Civic Platform, which thus became the 
first incumbent governing party to secure re-election for a second term of office since the fall 
of communism in 1989. Although most commentators expected the party to win, it did so by 
a larger than expected margin garnering 39.18% of the vote while Law and Justice came a 
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strong but fairly distant second with 29.89%. As a result, Mr Tusk’s party won 207 seats in 
the 460-member Sejm, compared with 157 for Law and Justice.  
 
Table 1: October 2011 Polish parliamentary election results to the Sejm 
 2007 2011 % 
Change  % Seats % Seats 
Civic Platform (PO) 41.51 209 39.18 207 -2.33 
Law and Justice (PiS) 32.11 166 29.89 157 -2.22 
Palikot Movement (RP)   10.02 40 +10.02 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) 8.91 31 8.36 28 -0.55 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)* 13.15 53 8.24 27 -4.91 
Polish is the Most Important (PJN)   2.19  +2.19 
New Right (NP)   1.06  +1.06 
Polish Labour Party (PPP)   1.00  0.55  -0.45 
Source: Polish State Electoral Commission (http://www.pkw.gov.pl/) 
* In 2007, the party contested the election as part of the ‘Left and Democrats’ (LiD) coalition with Polish Social 
Democracy (SdPl) and the Democrats (Demokraci). 
 
Civic Platform’s victory was due, in part, to its ability to craft an extremely broad appeal and 
identify itself skilfully with mainstream public opinion. However, given that the size of the 
two main parties ‘core’ electorates was roughly similar, one of the main factors determining 
the election outcome was always likely to be the level of turnout. Many observers felt that a 
lower turnout would benefit Law and Justice whose core supporters were more highly 
motivated and easier to mobilise than Civic Platform’s less disciplined voters. The latter had 
turned out in large numbers in 2007 mainly because they disliked Mr Kaczyński’s 
confrontational style of politics, so the key to Civic Platform’s victory would to be its ability 
to generate fear about the possible consequences of Law and Justice returning to power. The 
election result suggested that although many of the party’s supporters were disappointed with 
its slow progress in modernising the country, most voters clearly viewed Civic Platform as 
the better guarantor of stability at a time of crisis and continued to harbour deeply ingrained 
concerns about Law and Justice. Memories of Mr Kaczyński’s previous period in office were 
evidently still fresh enough to mobilise these disillusioned Civic Platform voters. Moreover, 
Mr Kaczyński’s mistakes during the final stages of the campaign, such as his comments 
about Mrs Merkel, provided Mr Tusk’s party with the ammunition that it needed for an 
effective counter-mobilisation of its more passive supporters. In the event, at 48.92% the 
level of turnout in 2011 was around the norm for much of the 1990s and early 2000s 
(although down from 53.88% in 2007) which meant that enough Civic Platform supporters 
came out to vote to give Mr Tusk’s party its historic second victory by a very clear margin. In 
other words, if the 2007 election was a referendum on the out-going Law and Justice 
government then the 2011 poll turned into one on whether the main opposition party offered 
a credible alternative to Mr Tusk’s administration, and most voters felt that it did not. 
 
As Table 1 also shows, the Peasant Party won 8.36% of the vote, finishing fourth among the 
five parties that crossed the 5% threshold, and 28 seats in the new Sejm. This gave the 
governing coalition 235 seats in total, enough to secure a small but workable parliamentary 
majority. Although some party leaders had hoped for more, this was a relatively good result 
for the agrarian party given that many opinion polls during the campaign (and, indeed, 
previous parliament) showed its support hovering around the 5% mark, and it was the first 
time that party had managed to hold on to its share of the vote after a period in office. Given 
that it had the most developed grassroots organisation of any Polish party much of its 
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campaigning took place at the local level and was often not picked up by the national media; 
as a consequence of which opinion polls often tended to under-state the party’s actual level of 
support. 
 
Apart from the re-election of Mr Tusk’s government, the other major story of this election 
was the success of the Palikot Movement (RP), an anti-clerical liberal party formed less than 
a year ago by the controversial and flamboyant businessman and former Civic Platform 
deputy Janusz Palikot. As Table 1 shows, the Palikot Movement ended up winning just over 
10% of the vote, which translated into 40 seats making it the third largest grouping in the new 
Sejm, overtaking the longer-established Peasant Party and the once-powerful Democratic 
Left Alliance. With his radical and outspoken attacks on the Law and Justice party, Mr 
Palikot had previously been a useful outrider for Civic Platform. However, after the 
Smolensk tragedy he started to become a liability when he blamed the crash on the 
irresponsibility of the Kaczyński brothers and claimed that the late President may have been 
under the influence of alcohol during the ill-fated flight (earlier he had accused Mr Kaczyński 
of being an alcoholic). At the end of 2010, Mr Palikot left Civic Platform complaining at 
what he saw as its conservative tilt and formed his own group with a socially liberal 
programme that included reducing the influence of Poland’s powerful Catholic Church in 
public life, the de-criminalisation of so-called ‘soft’ drugs, abortion on demand, and more 
rights for sexual and other minorities including the legalisation of same-sex civil unions. 
 
Until the final stages of the election support for the Palikot Movement stood at a mere 1-3%. 
However, Mr Palikot ran a dynamic, clearly targeted and extremely well executed campaign 
trying to move beyond his frivolous image and present himself as a serious political leader 
and intellectual. Knowing that the impact of his original anti-clerical appeal was likely to be 
limited, Mr Palikot began to place greater emphasis upon his broader message of business-
friendly, small-state social liberalism, promising to bring about a ‘modern, secular, socially 
oriented, civic and friendly’ state. The Palikot Movement thereby attracted a significant 
number of younger voters who wanted efficient government but also had socially liberal 
views on lifestyle issues and felt that Civic Platform and the Democratic Left Alliance were 
too establishment-oriented and deferential towards the Catholic Church.  
 
The success of Mr Palikot’s ‘new left’ was achieved in large part at the expense of the 
Democratic Left Alliance, whose campaign lacked the Palikot Movement’s energy and 
vigour and failed to develop a distinctive and coherent message. Previously the dominant 
party on the Polish centre-left, as Table 1 shows, the Alliance suffered its worst ever election 
defeat, finishing a distant fifth with only 8.24% of the vote and 27 seats. The result was a 
huge disappointment for the party and prompted Mr Napieralski to announce that he would 
stand down as leader at a special congress in December. Only a year earlier, Mr Napieralski 
ran a surprisingly vigorous presidential election campaign to finish an impressive third with a 
much better than expected 13.7% of the vote. This appeared to establish the Democratic Left 
Alliance as the dominant force on the Polish left and Mr Napieralski as its unquestioned party 
leader. However, this proved to be a false dawn and the party lost ground as it struggled to 
find an effective response to the series of high profile defections to Civic Platform by 
prominent left-wing politicians such as Mr Arłukowicz. Mr Napieralski became too self-
confident after his surprisingly good presidential election result and, as a consequence, when 
drawing up the party’s election candidate lists paid too much attention to internal party 
manoeuvring rather choosing candidates who could attract broad support.  
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The impact of Europe 
 
The election coincided with Poland’s first ever turn at the head of the rotating presidency of 
the EU so it was inevitable that Europe would play a role in this campaign. Civic Platform 
hoped to use the timing of the presidency to boost its electoral chances by providing Mr Tusk 
and other ministers with a major European and global platform. However, the almost daily 
dose of negative news from the euro zone meant that the Polish presidency became 
dominated by the EU crisis and Mr Tusk’s government was frustrated by Poland’s exclusion 
from many of the key European debates because it was not a euro zone member. This made 
the EU presidency less of an electoral asset than Civic Platform had originally hoped for. 
 
Mr Tusk’s government had made ensuring that Poland was seen as a predictable and reliable 
EU member one of the hallmarks of its foreign policy and clear point of differentiation 
between itself and its Law and Justice-led predecessor. When it came to power in 2007, the 
new Civic Platform-led government made a concerted effort to re-focus Polish foreign policy 
in a pro-EU direction and change the country’s image as a ‘trouble-maker’ on European 
issues. It also adopted a more conciliatory tone towards Brussels and the major EU states, 
paying special attention to improving strained relations with Germany, with whom the Law 
and Justice-led government had clashed bitterly. Indeed, some commentators suggested that 
Civic Platform’s 2007 election victory represented Poland’s ‘second return to Europe’. 
 
In fact, during this election the two main parties focused mainly on domestic issues and when 
they did campaign on Europe treated it as a so-called ‘valence issue’ where they competed 
over who was most competent to pursue a shared objective; in this case, representing and 
advancing Polish ‘national interests’ most effectively within the EU. Civic Platform argued 
that it, in adopting a positive and constructive approach with Warsaw’s main EU allies, it had 
located Poland within the so-called ‘European mainstream’, thus increasing the country’s role 
in the EU decision making process. This, they claimed, stood in favourable contrast to the 
period of Law and Justice government when Poland became isolated and unable to forge 
stable long-term alliances. In particular, the party tried to use Civic Platform politicians who 
held prominent positions within European institutions - notably European Parliament (EP) 
President Jerzy Buzek and European Commissioner Janusz Lewandowski - as way of 
convincing Poles that it was the party best placed to fight Poland’s corner in negotiations on 
the 2014-20 EU budget. This caused some controversy given that Mr Lewandowski was 
meant to be an impartial official at the centre of the Commission’s work on the budget. 
 
Law and Justice, on the other hand, fiercely criticised Mr Tusk’s government for ‘hauling up 
the white flag of surrender’, accusing it of insufficient robustness in defending Poland within 
the EU and relying too much upon Germany whose interests, they argued, often conflicted 
with Warsaw’s. Mr Kaczyński’s party said that identifying Poland with the ‘European 
mainstream’ was nothing to boast about. Any government that agreed to everything that 
Brussels and the main EU states proposed would inevitably win plaudits for its ‘constructive’ 
approach but, like Mr Tusk’s administration, have little concrete to show for it. While the 
Law and Justice-led governments’ approach may, at times, have annoyed Brussels and 
Poland’s EU partners, this was an inevitable price to pay for standing up robustly in defence 
of Poland’s national interests and had proved a more effective means of extracting 
concessions.  
 
Differences between the two main parties over approaches to Europe were also a question of 
different political styles and self-images, and the images that they attempted to portray of 
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their political opponents. On the one hand, Civic Platform tried to present its European policy 
within the context of a broader self-image as a pragmatic and pro-Western modernising force 
compared with Law and Justice which, it argued, represented backward, provincial 
nationalism. Law and Justice, on the other hand, tried to locate the party’s approach to 
European integration as part of its self-image as a patriotic party determined to stand up to the 
major EU states in order to advance Polish interests. The party also presented itself as a 
staunch defender of Polish cultural identity and Catholic religious values that was prepared to 
clash with the West European left-liberal political and media establishment and cultural elites 
in order to ensure that the EU respected these traditional values. 
 
Among the other parties, the Democratic Left Alliance tried to make Europe an election 
issue, even publishing a separate foreign policy document as part of its election programme. 
At one point, the party highlighted the fact that it was a Democratic Left Alliance-led 
government that had negotiated Poland’s EU membership and signed the accession treaty in 
the early 2000s. It also criticised the Civic Platform-led government for failing to sign up to 
the EU charter of fundamental rights (a concession made to Law and Justice and President 
Kaczynski, who negotiated an opt-out for Poland as part of the Lisbon treaty, in order to 
secure its ratification in the previous parliament) and pursuing adoption of the euro with 
insufficient vigour. In spite of the turbulence in the euro zone, as part of its commitment to be 
seen to be at the centre of the EU’s decision-making core, the Tusk government remained 
committed to Poland joining the euro, but as a long-term strategic goal rather than short-term 
priority. 
 
Finally, one of the striking features of this election, compared to many of those held in 
Poland during the previous decade, was the electoral marginalisation (indeed, almost total 
absence) of parties that were hostile to, or extremely critical of, European integration. The 
only real exceptions were two small radical Eurosceptic groupings: the Polish Right (PR) 
party, a right-wing conservative Catholic breakaway from Law and Justice led by former 
Sejm speaker Marek Jurek; and the New Right (NP) grouping led by the maverick radical 
economic libertarian-social conservative Janusz Korwin-Mikke. However, these two parties 
failed to gather enough signatures to register nationwide candidate lists and none of the seven 
parties that did expressed any fundamental hostility towards the European integration project. 
The only major party that was critical of the EU was Law and Justice which, in rhetorical 
terms at least, maintained a broad ideological commitment to a more ‘Gaullist’ inter-
governmental approach to integration. However, the party’s support for policies such as a 
large EU budget and fiscal transfers between richer and poorer states meant that its 
‘ideological’ preference for inter-governmentalism often gave way in practice to support for 
the ‘community method’ and supranational institutions like the European Commission that 
shared these priorities. 
 
 
Future Prospects 
 
Civic Platform emerged from the election with a historically unprecedented renewed mandate 
and supportive presidency held by a party nominee who was extremely unlikely to act as any 
kind of constitutional impediment to its legislative programme. The ruling party also had the 
luxury of not having to contest any national elections until the next EP poll scheduled for 
June 2014. Moreover, Mr Tusk emerged greatly strengthened within his own party and - 
having announced during the election campaign that, if re-elected, this would be his final 
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term as prime minister - with an incentive to look beyond short-term electoral considerations 
and build his political legacy by tackling more difficult issues.  
 
Although the election results opened up various possibilities for Civic Platform, the party 
decided to continue with current governing coalition with the Peasant Party. Mr Palikot was a 
maverick and his party an unstable construct that contained many new deputies who were not 
widely known and had no previous parliamentary experience. Although Mr Tusk hoped to 
solicit the Movement’s informal support on a number of specific issues, such as de-regulation 
of the economy, he avoided making any formal agreements with its unpredictable leader. In 
the longer term, there was also a chance that Civic Platform would try and pick up individual 
defectors from the Palikot Movement, particularly among the generally pragmatic and non-
ideological local entrepreneurs who were elected on the party’s ticket and likely to orientate 
towards whoever was  the ‘party of power’. 
 
The re-elected Civic Platform-Peasant Party coalition was likely to continue to function 
smoothly as long as Mr Tusk’s party did not threaten the interests of its partner’s core 
electorate. However, the coalition had never faced a really severe governing crisis in the 
previous parliament and it was difficult to predict how the partners would behave if the 
government came under more intense pressure. The increasingly gloomy economic outlook 
and ongoing euro zone crisis increased the pressure upon Mr Tusk to undertake the kind of 
drastic and politically difficult fiscal measures advocated by many analysts as necessary to 
put the country’s public finances in order. There was also a much greater expectation that 
Civic Platform would finally deliver on the reform and modernisation package that it 
promised in 2007 but, at best, only succeeded in partly implementing. There was a danger 
that this would put the unity of the government under much greater strain particularly if Mr 
Tusk’s party started to by-pass its coalition partner and appeal directly to the Palikot 
Movement and Democratic Left Alliance in order to win parliamentary votes. 
 
In fact, amid growing worries about the potential impact on Poland of the euro zone’s 
continuing sovereign debt crisis, in his policy speech setting out the re-elected coalition’s 
priorities for the next four years Mr Tusk indicated that the re-elected government would 
embark upon more decisive policies. The prime minister announced a series of far-reaching 
initiatives and austerity measures designed to improve Poland’s finances and protect the 
country from the global financial crisis. These fiscal policy and pension reform measures 
were aimed as much at re-assuring the financial markets, credit agencies and the EU that the 
new government was making a serious effort to speed up structural reforms, as they were at 
Polish citizens and voters. Controversially from the perspective of Peasant Party, they 
included pledges to phase out special pension arrangements for Polish farmers and bring 
them into the normal social security and tax systems; measures that, if fully implemented, 
threatened to undermine the governing coalition’s stability and cohesion. 
 
Mr Tusk’s speech contained virtually no references to Poland’s European policy nor, indeed, 
foreign policy more generally. However, very shortly afterwards foreign minister Radosław 
Sikorski ignited a lively debate on Poland’s approach to the European integration when he 
made a major speech in Berlin calling for the EU to evolve in the direction of a German-led 
federation; a move that provoked a fierce negative reaction from the right-wing opposition. 
The fact that Mr Sikorski’s speech was quickly followed up by a European Council summit 
that agreed to begin negotiations on a new inter-governmental treaty on fiscal stability 
involving all the current EU members except for the UK, meant that the European issue 
looked set to remain high on the political agenda in Poland. 
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